By Christos Evangeliou
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Extra info for Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry
Thus, for example, both a man and an ox are animals. Each of these is called by a common name, * animal', and the definition of being is also the same; for if one is to give the definition of each—what being an animal is for each of them—one will give the same definition. When things get their name from something, with a difference of ending, they are called paronymous. " Now, if one is willing to consider the possible ways in which names, definitions, and things, are related, then the following scheme suggests itself: (a) things which have in common only the name; (b) things which have in common both name and definition; (c) things which have in common neither name nor definition; (d) things which have in common only the definition; (e) things which have in common name and definition partially.
97-101 and , Guthrie , pp. 138-141, Owens , pp. 14-23, Rijk , pp. 76-92, Ross , pp. 83-90, and , pp. 20-25, Anton  and , Gillespie , Graeser , Kahn , Kosman , Malcolm , and Moravcsik . For the most complete list of pro posed interpretations of the Aristotelian doctrine of categories, see Brentano , pp. 49-130. 34 PORPHYRY ON ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES of the treatise is to deal with simple significant words (άπλαι σημαντικαί φωναι).
For, unless there are real things or beings to refer to, our speech is meaningless. It is precisely the reference to those realities which determines the truth or falsehood of a proposition, according to this interpretation. Therefore, 4 'the things said" must be understood as the signified things rather than the signifying signs. 30 In Metaphysics 1027b 25-30, Aristotle claims that "Falsity and truth are not in things but in thought. . The combination and the separation are in thought and not in the things and that which is in this sense is a different sort of 'being' from the things that are in the full sense" (Ross* translation).
Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry by Christos Evangeliou