By Peter Geach, Max Black
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Extra info for Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege
Moreover, the fact that the response of internal sense is involuntary and immediate makes it especially effective in moving the audience emotionally. If listeners or readers become conscious of the orator’s art, the response loses the immediacy of a sense impressions and awakens the critical faculties, which become suspicious of artful prose as designed for effect. The orator must manage such responses and Gerard’s analysis (via Campbell) can help. Other forces internal to rhetoric as an emerging and changing discipline also influenced the conception of rhetoric in POR.
The evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, and the evidence of the necessary relations of things, are all distinct and original kinds of evidence, equally grounded on our constitution: none of them depends upon, or can be resolved into another. To reason against any of these kinds of evidence, is absurd; nay to reason for them, is absurd. They are first principles; and such fall not within the province of reason, but of common sense. ” Reid maintains that these criteria meet the traditional logician’s test of self-evidence—not necessarily that to doubt them is a contradiction in terms but that to doubt them is absurd (1970, 32), is, in fact, madness (40).
But as we increasingly identify with the other through sympathy that idea becomes emotionally freighted. A passion is an impression for Hume, so that sympathy is a vehicle for converting an idea into an impression: “When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection” (II.
Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege by Peter Geach, Max Black